The history of marine resource use is largely a story of the interplay between biology, market forces, and governing institutions. A Google search of the word fisheries generates hundreds of thousands of references, most from the perspective of fisheries science or fisheries management. References related to fisheries management generally view the fisheries "problem" as one of biological overexploitation and thus argue that the solution requires controlling and constraining fishing mortality, with top-down controls over the type, spatial placement, and timing of fishing gear deployment.
Introduction
The history of marine resource use is largely a story of the interplay between biology, market forces, and governing institutions. A Google search of the word fisheries generates hundreds of thousands of references, most from the perspective of fisheries science or fisheries management. References related to fisheries management generally view the fisheries "problem" as one of biological overexploitation and thus argue that the solution requires controlling and constraining fishing mortality, with top-down controls over the type, spatial placement, and timing of fishing gear deployment.
Economists generally argue that conventional fisheries management methods such as gear restrictions, closed seasons, closed areas, and other command and control methods address only the symptoms of the fisheries problem rather than its root cause (Wilen 2006) . Economists maintain that fishermen are not inherently inclined to overexploit marine resources, but rather are forced to operate in institutional environments that generate perverse incentives. In particular, much of the historical legacy of fisheries misuse has taken place in institutional settings in which users do not have secure access to the resource until fish are landed, and hence the "rule of capture" prevails (Libecap 1989) . Without secure access to a resource, fishermen scramble and compete wastefully with each other for a share of what is a common pool resource.
Fisheries management institutions have adjusted and adapted over the last century, largely in an action-reaction response to failures of command and control modes of operation. Historically, most fisheries have begun initial exploitation under pure open access conditions, persisting for some time with seemingly benign results. But as demand has risen or technology has lowered costs, such fisheries have come under increasing pressure from the entry of fishermen, and ultimately the resource has become overexploited. The fisheries science literature emphasizes the biological overexploitation consequences of open access conditions, as in the heavily cited article by Garrett Hardin (1968) that spawned the "tragedy of the commons" metaphor. But as the earlier article by Gordon (1954) points out, exploitation of the commons not only degrades the biological productivity of the resource but also wastes all the potential economic rents. Indeed, Gordon demonstrated that economic rents drive the dynamics of the system under open access, inducing entry and overexploitation that continues until rents are dissipated away. Gordon thus demonstrated that the so-called tragedy was not a tragedy in the sense of an inexorable process, but rather a problem of incomplete property rights.
For most of the last century, most of the world's fisheries were outside the 12-mile jurisdiction claimed by coastal nations and was thus subject to pure open access conditions. The postWorld War II boom in shipbuilding, coupled with the rise in demand for fish, resulted in rapid and dramatic overexploitation. Fisheries within the narrow coastal zones were managed by patchworks of domestic regulations, bilateral treaties between nations sharing stocks, and largely ineffective multilateral organizations attempting to manage highly migratory fisheries.
The UN Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), concluded in 1982, set the stage for an historic change by extending coastal nations' resource claims to 200 miles, bringing 95 percent of the most valuable fisheries under the jurisdiction of coastal nations exercising new Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) rights. Although coastal nations were suddenly granted newly legitimized rights over many stocks that had been depleted by fleets from many nations, it has taken years to create new domestic laws, institutions to manage domestic fleets, and treaties to control shared stocks. Over the last thirty years, most open access fisheries have been gradually brought under the control and management of newly created and evolving regulatory institutions.
The role of economists has become increasingly important as fisheries management institutions have evolved to manage the new resources under coastal nations' extended mandates. As early as the 1970s, economists such as Francis Christy (1973 Christy ( , 1975 advocated addressing the insecurity of fisheries property rights by creating individual transferable quotas (ITQs) for the allowable harvests recommended by management biologists. But it was not until the UNCLOS opened up an expanded management scope that the notion of rights-based management began to take hold. In the early 1980s, Iceland, the Netherlands, and New Zealand all brought significant fisheries within their EEZs under rights-based management institutions. Thus began a slow transition from regulated open and regulated restricted access fisheries to rights-based fisheries, which to date still encompass only about 25 percent of the world's fisheries (Arnason 2012a) .
Although ITQs have been the dominant form of rights-based management institutions adopted since the UNCLOS, two other forms of rights-based systems have also been adopted: harvester cooperatives and territorial use rights fisheries, known as TURFs. This article, which is part of a symposium, "Rights-Based Fisheries Management," 1 examines the characteristics, design, and operation of TURFs and the advantages and challenges of using them to manage fisheries. We begin in the next section with some background concerning species-based rights systems. This is followed by discussions of the history, operation, and potential gains from place-based systems (or TURFs), the deficiencies of species-based systems, and key conditions for the success of TURFs. Next we present evidence from experience with TURFs in Japan and Chile. We then revisit the issue of whether rights-based systems should be species-based or place-based. We conclude with some final thoughts about the potential for space-based TURFs as a viable policy alternative to species-based ITQs.
Background: Species-Based Rights Systems
Rights-based fisheries management institutions have mostly created rights on a population-or species-specific basis. That is, users are granted a share of catch based on a biological determination of the total allowable catch (TAC) for a particular population of fish. This approach is a legacy of the fisheries management system itself, which has also been largely species-based and biologically driven. The body of fisheries science in the post-World War II period evolved largely from a single-species population dynamics perspective. Pioneering fisheries scientists, including Beverton and Holt (1957) and Schaefer (1957) , introduced new notions such as maximum sustainable yield (MSY) that became targets for fisheries managers. Although fisheries scientists were well aware of the fact that individual fisheries populations interact in systems where predator-prey relationships are also important, the tasks of developing and calibrating individual-level population models were difficult enough, leading to the dominance of single-species management approaches. An outgrowth of the single-species management orientation was the approach of viewing the spatial scope of management as covering the entire geographic range of a population. For populations confined to the EEZs of single countries, this often meant uniform regulations over large areas within which the species was found. For populations whose range extended over multiple nations' EEZs, efforts were often made to harmonize regulations or, in some cases, to integrate them. As management within EEZs gradually turned to rights-based systems, the most common design principle was thus to demarcate the spatial extent of the rights over the full range of a given population. At the same time, scientists have begun to better understand population processes, and they have concluded that it is more accurate to consider some populations as composed of subpopulations associated with particular regions. This new understanding about the spatial heterogeneity of population processes will likely lead to new rights-based designs that differentiate rights more finely over space.
Introduction to Space-Based Rights, or TURFS

History and Operation of TURFs
TURFs have a long history of traditional use around islands in the South Pacific and have been well studied by anthropologists (Johannes 1977) . TURFS have also sometimes been used to manage resources in freshwater lakes and rivers, generally as part of rights associated with adjacent land resources. In addition, spatial rights have been used for centuries in tidal zones to manage resources such as clams, mussels, oysters, and kelp. In both inland and tidal zone areas, delineating rights is feasible because it is relatively easy to demarcate and defend the spatial unit. However, TURFs have generally been viewed as more problematic in nearshore and offshore marine environments because of the long-standing common belief that "we can't fence the ocean." Nevertheless, TURFs have been and are being used in nearshore coastal marine environments in various places around the world. TURFs are generally associated with the water column over a specific marine substrate or identified with coastal landmarks. Some TURFs have been adopted to manage resources attracted to floating fish aggregating devices (FADs).
2 Others have been associated with floating fish farm cages, artificial habitat structures, and oyster and mussel cages in estuaries and subtidal zones. Most TURFs do not convey full ownership rights to resources. Instead, access rights are granted on behalf of the nation's citizens, whereas actual ownership of coastal resources generally resides with the nation. The scope of rights granted under TURFs can be broad or narrow. At one end of the spectrum, a TURF may grant rights to use any and all marine resources within a designated area in an unrestricted manner that allows grantees leeway to address the many externalities associated with marine systems. Coastal zone ecosystems are complex, and broad scope TURFs may encompass dozens of species ranging from sedentary organisms that reside in or on the bottom to migratory fish that swim through the water column. At the other end of the spectrum, a TURF may grant rights to use only a single resource or a subset of resources, and in ways that are significantly constrained by regulations. For example, many states lease tidal and subtidal lands to producers of oysters or mussels. These simple leases designate an area within which only oyster or mussels may be harvested, often with restrictions on planting density and other attributes that may cause spillovers to other producers or other environmental services.
The Potential Gains from TURFs
What are the potential gains from creating a TURF? A straightforward measure of gains is the generation of new net economic value associated with TURF creation. Under this definition, success depends on the basis used for comparison, namely the status quo before creation of the TURF. In principle, the largest potential new value is likely to occur when the status quo is open access resource use. In this case, creating a TURF has the potential to mitigate the open access rent dissipation identified by Gordon, and thus to create new economic value and wealth.
What do we know about the potential rents that can be generated when fisheries move from open access conditions to rights-based institutions that provide proper incentives? First, the early rents are often generated on the market side of the ledger as increases in revenues that are realized before inputs are reconfigured, redundant overcapacity is removed, and costs are reduced (Homans and Wilen 2005) . Ex-vessel prices have risen by a third or more in some cases as highly compressed and intensive "derby" fisheries convert into year-round seasons with fresh rather than frozen form (Casey et al. 1995) . Second, the share of revenues represented by rents can be larger than one might imagine, in some cases 70 to 80 percent (Wilen 2006) . Third, additional savings are generated as fishermen innovate and find new methods that both reduce costs and increase value (Wilen 2004) . Finally, additional rents may be generated by rebuilding the biological productivity of stocks that are overexploited under open access (Sanchirico, Wilen, and Coleman 2010) . The bottom line is that new rents can be on the order of five to ten times the revenues associated with open access resource use. At a global level, this suggests waste on the order of a trillion dollars from incomplete property rights and perverse incentives in the world's marine capture fisheries (Wilen 2004; World Bank 2009 (Homans and Wilen 1997) . The degree to which residual values remain in these circumstances depends on the nature of the constraints associated with the existing regulatory system. In particular, when regulations bind up critical inputs with low elasticities of substitution, the ability to overinvest in unregulated inputs under the race to fish may be limited (Campbell and Lindner 1990; Deacon, Finnoff, and Tschirhart 2011) .
Although conventional command and control measures such as closed areas and seasons and gear restrictions can successfully sustain the biological productivity, they may also waste the economic rents, either fully or partially. Perhaps the most important generalization that can be made concerning the potential rents that can be gained from shifting to TURFs is that when harvesters operate under insecure access rights, they will be relentless in competing for a share of the insecure harvest, leading to investments and fishing practices that are wasteful and distortionary. Whether this dissipates all rents or leaves some residual rents is an empirical question. There are many examples of limited entry licensing programs that exhibit some rents in permits, even under fishing operations that are frenzied races to fish (e.g., Huppert, Ellis, and Noble 1996; Karpoff 1984) . Casual observation suggests there are generally significant new rents created by the switch to secure rights and the creation of conditions that foster maximizing value rather than racing to secure volume.
Perhaps more surprising is that a TURF may generate additional value even in those fisheries that have been rationalized with high-quality secure access rights, such as ITQs. The beneficial impacts of species-based instruments like ITQs have been well documented (e.g., Wilen 2006) . The changes in incentives created by giving fishermen secure access to the resource are immediate and dramatic because fishermen no longer race each other to capture a share of the physical resource and instead devote effort to maximizing the value of catch. But ITQs as typically designed are still imperfect property rights because they do not eliminate all perverse incentives (Boyce 1992) . There are thus likely to be a number of gains from resolving the residual externalities associated with ITQs, gains that could be generated through properly designed TURFs. We discuss the residual externalities and other shortcomings associated with species-based systems such as ITQs in more detail in the next section.
The Economics of Territorial Use Rights Fisheries, or TURFs
Residual Externalities under Species-Based ITQs
Some of the most important residual externalities from ITQs are those associated with space. A significant finding from the past two decades of oceanographic research is the discovery that fish populations are not distributed homogeneously over space, as is implicitly assumed with most species-based regulations. The modern view is that fish populations are distributed over space as metapopulations, or distinct subpopulations linked by spatial processes (Sanchirico and Wilen 1999) . These spatial processes involve adult movement, which may be motivated by relative density and larval and juvenile movement, with both typically influenced by oceanographic processes.
Metapopulation Externalities
Fully optimal exploitation of metapopulations requires precise allocation of effort and harvest that accounts for the spatial externalities associated with biological spatial linkages (Costello and Polasky 2008; Kafine and Costello 2011; Sanchirico and Wilen 2005) . In contrast, spatially uniform ITQs distributed over the spatial range of the population will leave gains from spatial coordination unrealized but potentially achievable with TURFs and/or other forms of spatial management.
Even if metapopulations are not explicitly linked biologically, important economic considerations are associated with the spatial distribution of effort. Consider, for example, a population consisting of multiple independent subpopulations spread over a coastline. Any spatially undifferentiated ITQ system that allows fishermen to fish over any subpopulation invites misallocation of effort over space, generally too much near ports and too little in distant areas. Alternatively, different subpopulations may have different productivity, so that undifferentiated ITQs invite overexploitation of the most productive and underexploitation of less productive patches. This phenomenon has been recognized by fisheries researchers as far back as Warming (1911) and Gordon (1954) , who both wrote about spatial misallocation under open access exploitation. Moreover, there is a rich empirical literature on the determinants of spatial fishing location (Abbott and Wilen 2011; Bockstael and Opaluch 1983; Curtis and McConnell 2004; Eales and Wilen 1986; Hicks and Schnier 2006; Holland and Sutinen 2000; Smith and Wilen 2003) , all of which shows that fishermen make choices in complex and heterogeneous spatial settings. This spatial heterogeneity could be addressed with spatially differentiated ITQs or spatial tax/subsidy instruments, although this is seldom contemplated (Sanchirico and Wilen 2008) .
Intraseasonal Externalities
Another class of problems not typically resolved with conventionally designed ITQs is intraseasonal externalities. One common situation is negligible within-season growth of the biomass, which means that fishing decreases the standing biomass over the season. If fishing costs increase with diminishing biomass, an individual fisherman will not account for the impact of his early-season harvests on later-season biomass and others' subsequent costs. A conventional undifferentiated ITQ system will not resolve this residual within-season stock externality, although an ITQ system differentiated more finely over time (e.g., by day or week) might (Boyce 1992) .
Another problem left unresolved by ITQs is congestion externalities. For example, in many important fisheries, including salmon, herring and other pelagics, pollock, and whiting, populations migrate and then congregate in large aggregations on spawning grounds. It is generally less expensive to harvest dense aggregates, and the fish are also most valuable when fat and laden with roe. But a large fleet on a concentrated spawning ground may generate congestion externalities that manifest through gear interference, scattering of fish, diminished quality, and so on. Under these circumstances, individual rights to catch an undifferentiated fraction of a population do not provide incentives to spread harvests over time (or space) in a manner that optimizes fleet costs (Anderson 1989; Costello and Deacon 2007; Holland 2011; Huang et al. 2011 ). 
Predator-Prey Linkages
Ecosystems are interconnected food webs, with numerous predator-prey linkages between different populations and even within the same population. A systemwide perspective requires accounting for those interrelationships by weighing the value of catching another fish against the value of leaving it as prey for another population (Hannesson and Herrick 2010) . In principle, an individual species-based ITQ system could be designed to account for predator-prey interrelationships by setting TACs in a manner that reflects cross-species interactions.
An interesting question is whether cross-species externalities might be dealt with by spontaneous negotiation (Coasian bargaining) between representatives of rights holders for specific species. For example, suppose that cod eat herring and both are valuable as target species. Suppose further that TAC determinations are made in a way that ignores the valuable role herring plays in producing cod. In this case it is possible that cod fishermen would wish to purchase TAC allocations from herring fishery rights holders up until the point that the last herring bought just paid for its beneficial impact on cod stocks and harvests. However, this would be unlikely to occur with individual action, and hence some collective organization representing all or most cod fishermen would have to be formed to carry out the negotiations on behalf of the group.
Although cross-species interconnections are clearly important, no ITQ systems account for such interactions directly and explicitly through modified TAC determinations. For example, even though the North Atlantic complex of cod, capelin, and herring is one of the most well-studied predator-prey systems in the world, and fishermen from Iceland, Norway, Denmark, and Russia have harvested the fish for decades, no attempts have been made to account explicitly for known predator-prey linkages by individual or groups of harvesting nations. Nor do there appear to be any examples of ITQ systems in which representatives of predator harvesting groups have purchased prey allocations. In real fisheries, these mechanisms may be complicated, as, for example, when catch reduces numbers over the season but individuals grow and yield higher values per unit weight over the season. In these cases, it may be optimal to concentrate fishing early in the season (when biomass is large and costs are low) and late in the season (when value is high). See Holland (2011) for an interesting example of this situation.
The Economics of Territorial Use Rights Fisheries, or TURFs
Gear Impacts on Ecosystem Habitat
Another aspect of marine ecosystems that conventional ITQ design does not address is the impact of fishing on ecosystem habitat (Holland and Schnier 2006) . Some gear is notorious for its alleged damage to the structure of ecosystems; trawl gear and scallop dredges have been targeted by conservation groups as particularly destructive (Watling and Norse 1998) . The fisheries science literature typically discusses the impact of trawl and other gear on habitat as a problem of gear design. Much effort has been devoted to modifying trawl gear to reduce damage to marine habitat, typically by altering rollers and/or adding "ticklers" that drag lightly across the seafloor and induce fish to rise to the net towed just above the floor.
Although gear design clearly contributes to the destructive effects of gear on marine habitat, the manner in which gear is deployed, together with the timing and application over space, are choices made by skippers, who are in turn affected by the incentives they face. Skippers targeting various species choose how close to the bottom to tow, what depths and over which types of marine structures to fish, and how fast to drag gear. Many skippers contend that although instances of destructive gear-habitat interactions are often avoidable, they are inevitable under the regulated open access race to fish conditions. There is both conceptual and empirical evidence to support this contention, particularly in the spillover case of bycatch avoidance (Abbott and Wilen 2009 , 2011 . The implication is that even a reasonably well-designed ITQ system focused at the target species level will fail to provide incentives to protect valuable habitat or to avoid unwanted ecosystem spillover effects such as incidental catch of small fish, unmarketable fish, seabirds and mammals, and nontarget organisms.
Key Features for the Success of TURFs
Although it is straightforward to identify the potential gains from TURFs, substantive transactions costs and design choices are associated with making a TURF operational. Thus simply designating an area as a TURF and specifying spatial access rights will not alone resolve the property rights problem. In fact, in addition to delineating the spatial scope of resources for which rights are granted, a number of other key features appear to be necessary for TURFs to be successful.
Identification of a Closed Class of Users
The first condition for success is to identify an exclusive class of users in order to avoid open access dissipation of potential rents. Granting exclusive rights to a closed class of users generates incentives to invest in the resource without fear that the benefits will be dissipated by entry of nonmembers. A TURF may be designed to grant access rights to a very specific group of individuals or to an entity such as a harvester cooperative or a community, whose members then determine access rules internally.
Boundary Enforcement
A second condition for TURF success is the ability of the exclusive class of users (or insiders) to enforce the boundary against poaching by those outside the boundary. In societies with a well-established rule of law, poaching can be discouraged with civil policing and enforcement mechanisms. Alternatively, TURF members may enforce borders by force or coercion. The more successful the generation of value within the TURF, the greater the threat of poaching. Enforcement is costly, and the size of the TURF, its placement in the seacoast, and the nature of the features of the adjacent coastal landscape may reduce or increase the transactions costs of border enforcement. For example, a TURF located within a lagoon is much easier to police than one located along a lengthy stretch of uninhabited coastline.
Adoption of Rules of Use
In addition to identifying a closed class of users and enforcing the border against poaching, successful TURFs adopt internal rules and/or coordination mechanisms to give users proper incentives. This is necessary because simply identifying a closed class of users will not prevent them from dissipating the resource inside the TURF. Such mechanisms span a wide range from decentralization strategies to centralization and top-down coordination strategies. For example, one option is to devolve rights that have been granted to a group by, for example, creating an internally operated ITQ system, or a TURF within a TURF system. At the other end of the spectrum, a committee or elected subset of the exclusive user group may direct individuals to carry out fishing operations and distribute the proceeds in particular ways. As discussed later, examples of both decentralized and centralized command and control TURF mechanisms exist around the world.
Security of Tenure
Finally, the rights associated with TURFs need to be of sufficient duration and certainty to give users confidence in the payoffs from their investments. Experience has shown that creating property rights generates a very broad set of incentives to change operations, reduce amounts of gear, re-outfit surviving vessels, change product quality and product span, and make changes in handling, processing, and distribution infrastructure (Casey et al. 1995) . Many of these actions require investment to reap the full benefits, and programs with insecure or short tenures diminish the expected payoff from investment. The same point holds for investing in biological productivity. Many fisheries that are candidates for rationalization are overexploited and require investment to reach MSY or maximum efficient yield (MEY). The willingness of participants to rebuild the fishery depends on there being tenure of sufficient length to make the initial cost of reducing harvest worth the effort.
The next two sections examine cases studies of TURFs, focusing first on Japan's extensive system of nearshore TURFs, which has been in place for centuries, and then turning to Chile's nearshore TURFs, which are more recent.
Japan's Nearshore TURFs
Japan has one of the oldest and most well-developed TURF systems in the world. The system was originally put in place by the shoguns in the sixteenth century when coastal villages with poor access to rice land were granted exclusive use of the marine resources in zones extending off the coastline adjacent to such villages. In the early period, fishermen guilds in the coastal village assumed responsibility to protect TURF resources from outside poachers. Today, remnants of the feudal system are still in place, with TURF zones off villages now allocated to local fisher organizations called Fishery Cooperative Associations (FCAs). Customary use-based FCAs were legalized under the 1948 Fishery Cooperative Law that became the legal foundation of Japan's modern nearshore TURFs (Yamamoto 1995) .
Management Functions and Responsibilities
Ownership rights to Japan's marine resources are vested with the nation, and the Fishery Cooperative Law grants access rights and responsibilities directly to FCAs rather than individual fishermen. FCAs are thus the institutions with legal and administrative authority to manage Japan's nearshore TURF system, a duty that is shared with prefecture-level governments that provide scientific advice and oversight regulations.
There are currently approximately thirteen hundred FCAs in Japan. FCAs typically have responsibility for a large number of species, from sedentary benthic organisms, to kelp, to flatfish and rockfish, to mobile small pelagics, across a range of fixed and mobile gear types. TURF boundaries are generally associated with historical boundaries or with the municipality boundaries encompassing the associated fishing village, and they generally extend one to five kilometers into the nearshore zone.
Each FCA has adopted individualized administrative structures and operational modes to manage the fisheries within its zone. An FCA typically performs a number of traditional cooperative functions, including purchasing inputs, providing credit to fishermen, marketing harvests, operating landing and handling facilities, and operating aquaculture and other stock enhancement facilities. FCAs are somewhat unique among cooperative structures because they also manage the resources within the associated TURF zone. Actual operational management of the fisheries within an FCA is carried out by Fishery Management Organizations (FMOs), generally suborganizations within FCAs that have been created to devolve authority to make micro-level management decisions. There are currently more than seventeen hundred FMOs in the Japanese system (Uchida and Makino 2008) . Some FMOs (about 25 percent) manage all of the fisheries within a TURF associated with an FCA, but the majority (about 50 percent) are subsets of a given FCA, such as fishermen pursuing a particular species or using a particular gear type. In a few other cases, new FMOs have been formed that are composed of fishermen from different FCAs, for example, when a species' range covers the coastal zones of multiple FCAs.
FCAs make overarching decisions about the macro-allocation of the TURF space to different types of activities by designating various exclusive use or compatible use zones. This spatial management function is intensive in many TURFs, with specific subzones allocated to oyster, clam, and mussel beds, other zones allocated to urchin and abalone diving, sandy substrates allocated to flatfish fishing, areas devoted to small-scale set-net fishing, common areas open to multiple gear types, artificial reef areas, and net pen aquaculture zones. Well-managed TURFs look very much like intensive marine farming operations that arrange the use of the marine space to account optimally for seabed characteristics, currents and nutrient flows, habitat, and landscape features. This high level of control is a natural endpoint in the evolution of a mixed natural/aquaculture system with high-quality property rights (Anderson 2002) .
The operational management of the fisheries within Japan's TURF system is a collaborative effort between the FMOs and local prefecture governments. Prefecture-level fisheries management agencies establish open and closed fishing seasons, support limits on total fishing effort with limited entry programs, and provide scientific advice to FMOs about sustainable TACs. This provides the overall framework for micro-level management by committees of fishermen within the FMOs, which focuses mostly on decisions about controlling effort over time and space.
Comparison with Species-Based Systems
How does Japan's space-based system compare with what we might observe under a species-based rights system? First, some potential conflicts over space have been resolved under Japan's TURF system by assigning particular activities to particular zones of the FCA. Second, because use rights have not been allocated as shares of TACs, Japan's TURF system essentially operates under regulated restricted access conditions. Thus prefecture scientists set TACs and the prefectures license participation as in a conventional limited entry system, and then cooperative groups of fishermen (through their FMOs) determine the details of actual management. Although incentives are misaligned in Japan's space-based system because fishermen are inclined to race for fish, these perverse incentives are countered and constrained by the intensive management activities of the FMO committees of fishermen. Effort is generally micromanaged on a day-to-day basis by committees that make decisions about whether the fleet will fish or not, and if so, when and where it will deploy gear.
Innovations under Japan's TURF System
Despite the inefficiencies that remain in a system with misaligned incentives, there are a number of interesting innovations that have occurred under Japan's TURF system that would not likely have occurred under a system with multiple species-based ITQs. First is the system of zoning and allocation of space among different harvester groups and among different users of a TURF's marine ecosystem. FCAs in the Japanese system have in many cases solved elaborate spatial allocation problems in ways that separate conflicting gear types and conflicting uses. This is a direct outcome of a system that allocates the basic use rights for a place rather than for individual species.
A second innovation is the complex system of allocating fishing grounds that has emerged as FMOs make micro-decisions about managing effort. Among the more interesting components of this system are rotations that not only spread effort over space, but also ensure that each fisherman has an equal chance at hotspots. A good example is reported by Uchida and Watanobe (2008) , who discuss the walleye pollock fishery, where a meta-FMO organization manages fishermen from four FCAs in a longline fishery aimed at capturing fish with high roe content and high-quality flesh. In this case, the rotation system is designed to keep longline gear from entangling on the seafloor. The FMO approves the deployment of a limited number of gear sets in each area, and then it rotates access to the areas of seabed in order to equalize access to the best deployment areas.
A third innovation concerns fisheries in which the FMO limits harvest to take advantage of market conditions and maximize price. For example, in the Sakuraebi shrimp fishery, the FMO manages daily catches to avoid flooding the market and to take advantage of seasonal market blips associated with holidays and gift giving (Uchida 2007) .
Finally, a number of fisheries managed by FMOs have adopted harvest or revenue pooling arrangements (Platteau and Seki 2000; Uchida 2007) . Under intensive spatial effort management, fishermen's committees assign vessels over various areas of the FCA in order to homogenize spatial fishing mortality. But this means that some vessels face the periodic risk of receiving bad draws from the committee. To minimize conflict over this risk, some fisheries have adopted pooling of harvests. Fishermen fish in assigned areas, return with catch that is then pooled, and then net returns are redistributed to the group according to some prearranged rules. The primary goal of this policy is to reduce the risk of being assigned a low-producing area, but an important side effect is that it also reduces the race to fish. If harvest is pooled, individual fishermen no longer have incentives to beat their competitors to the fishing grounds, invest in more capacity, or engage in other wasteful competition. In fisheries where such pooling has been adopted, the task of managing effort is reduced because race to fish conditions are eliminated, making cooperation more feasible. This in turn has opened up new opportunities for further gains from cooperation, such as group investment in branding, quality enhancement, and stock enhancement.
Chile's Nearshore TURFs
Chile has a coastline that is 3,000 miles long, with a nearshore coastal marine ecosystem home to numerous benthic organisms, algae, finfish, and small-bodied pelagics. In 1991 Chile passed the landmark Chilean Fishery and Aquaculture Law (CFAL), which divided the Chilean coast into a nearshore zone out to 5 nautical miles and an offshore area covering the remainder of the 200-mile EEZ. The demarcation between offshore and onshore fisheries was intended to reduce conflict between large and mobile offshore industrial fishermen and small-and medium-scale nearshore local artisanal fishermen. The component of CFAL relevant to the discussion here is the provision that creates TURFs, called management and exploitation areas (MEAs), to manage nearshore benthic resources.
The Chilean TURF system operates in an ecosystem that encompasses dozens of different species of invertebrates and algae. The most important species economically are loco (an abalone-type gastropod), sea urchin, and limpets. Artisanal fishers harvest benthic organisms using diving equipment deployed from small boats less than 10 meters in length or gathering by hand in shallow areas.
Creation and Operation of MEAs
CFAL allows for the establishment of MEAs on a strictly voluntary basis. MEAs are granted only to registered and recognized fisher associations, rather than to individual fishermen. After an application to create an MEA is received, reviewed, and approved at the federal level, the fisher association must conduct a baseline study and develop a management plan at its expense. Once the MEA is approved to operate, the fisher cooperative must conduct yearly stock assessments and file harvesting plans with the federal government, again at its own expense. An annual rental fee is paid based on the size of the MEA, with the funds used to defray the costs of federal oversight of the program.
The first MEA was approved in 1997, after a contentious period of local and national debate that culminated in a set of rights and responsibilities for fisher associations operating MEAs.
Most early MEAs were created around traditional harvesting areas associated with long-standing local fisher cooperatives. The scale of MEAs was thus determined by historical practices, and applications for larger MEAs were discouraged by the annual rental fee. More recent MEAs have been created in remote southern areas that were previously subject to mobile open access fleets of harvesters.
MEA Methods of Resource Management
Creating a TURF establishes the preconditions for successful management by converting resources from open access to closed access. But actual successful management depends on the degree to which TURF members can self-govern the resources within the TURFs. In the Chilean system, there is substantial variation across MEAs in the internal methods used to manage marine resources. Some MEAs have not moved much beyond a within-TURF race to fish among the original fisher organization members, often with high levels of exploitation and attendant overexploitation. However, a large number of MEAs have rationalized harvest through plans generally developed and implemented by consensus at the grassroots level. A number of MEAs use sanctions for failing to comply with the organization's decisions about TURF operation, with fines imposed for failing to carry out border policing duties, attend meetings, or help with functions necessary to land, distribute, and market output. More serious sanctions, including suspension and expulsion, are imposed on members caught illegally harvesting within MEA borders. Some MEAs have implemented detailed ex ante procedures and protocols for avoiding and resolving internal conflicts, whereas others have adopted ex post voting and consensus-based mechanisms.
Finally, a number of MEAs adopted procedures for resolving residual externalities that would exist if the system was managed by a species-based rights system. For example, 73 percent of the MEAs surveyed in the fourth and fifth regions utilized some sort of effort coordination mechanisms that involved decisions such as allocating effort and assigning fishing grounds to specific divers in order to optimize the exploitation of space within the TURF. Others adopted rotating harvest zone policies. In MEAs where assignments led to unequal fishing opportunities, some implemented pooling arrangements like the FMOs in Japan.
Performance of MEAs
Cancino (2007) reports detailed survey-based results for the 1998-2005 period for a geographic panel snapshot of the important fourth and fifth administrative regions of Chile's coastal management system. By 2005, there were sixty-six MEAs in the two regions, with a mean size of 176 hectares and corresponding fisher associations averaging sixty-five members. The survey covered the "start-up" period for MEAs in these two regions, a time when many MEAs were established in historically productive areas that had been overexploited and needed rebuilding. Thus many MEAs imposed a moratorium on the loco harvest during this period, and the fisher associations invested in stock rebuilding. Approximately 25 percent of the MEAs surveyed reported zero harvesting in the first year following formal approval to harvest. About 12 percent of MEAs reported zero harvest rates during the second year, and a number maintained the moratorium in subsequent years. This resulted in significant increases in biomass. Average fishable stock density (i.e., the number of animals above the recommended minimum The Economics of Territorial Use Rights Fisheries, or TURFsbiological size) tripled between the first and fourth years of operation in the MEAs surveyed (Cancino 2007) .
Following the initial investment in stock rebuilding, most MEAs ramped up harvest rates as members developed mechanisms for coordinating and managing harvest. Although government biologists generally conclude that loco harvest rates of 20 to 35 percent of exploitable biomass are sustainable, many of the MEAs surveyed by Cancino (2007) adopted harvesting plans that were more conservative. During the 1998-2005 period, 21 percent of the requested TAC targets involved exploitation rates less than 20 percent, 9 percent were above 35 percent, and the rest were within the suggested exploitation band of 20 to 35 percent. In terms of actual harvest, 73 percent were below, 19 percent were equal to, and 8 percent were above the requested TAC targets,. In terms of the average size of loco harvested, biologists recommend a minimum size of 10 cm, but the actual average sizes were closer to 11.4 cm during the sample period (Cancino 2007) .
Two factors led to decisions to fish more conservatively during the 1998-2005 period. First, in areas that were overexploited during the pre-CFAL phase, the MEAs undertook conscious rebuilding efforts that required one or more years. Second, loco prices varied widely during this period due to exchange rate fluctuations. Because real prices declined overall during the period, many MEAs reduced harvests during the later years of the period, banked the fishable biomass, and returned to higher exploitation levels when prices recovered.
Marketing and Labor Use in MEAs
Most MEAs organize their fishing seasons in order to maximize revenues. This involves coordinating and contracting with buyers to deliver the entire year's harvest on a particular delivery date after a short period of intense harvesting. As a result, fishing for loco has been transformed from an industry in which many fishermen fished with low levels of success over long seasons to one in which effort is concentrated to maximize price. This is the opposite of what has occurred after rationalization in most other fisheries that have adopted rights-based policies. In most ITQ systems, for example, short and intense derby fishing has been replaced by protracted and slower seasons as fishermen attempt to shift most of their landings to year-long fresh markets. In Chile's loco fishery, the adoption of short seasons appears to be a consequence of having numerous small production units spread over the coast. Buyers and MEA operators have come to agreements in which the entire season's production is delivered sequentially by various individual MEAs, but the system is coordinated so that total harvest is distributed more or less uniformly over the marketing period, similar to what we observe in highly integrated agriculture. This has beneficial impacts on households because fishing becomes a means of supplementing income without high labor time opportunity costs.
Place-based Innovation in MEAs
Surveys of MEA managers suggest that some MEAs are practicing a form of ecosystem management. For example, loco thrive on organisms called sea squirts that cluster in particular areas of the TURF. Loco prey on the sea squirts and grow fat, resulting in a higher market price for loco. To enhance growth, some MEAs translocate loco to sea squirt beds. Other MEA managers report removing loco predators and otherwise transplanting organisms to enhance total abundance. One MEA manager reported installing an underwater dive course for nonlocal scuba divers that was "salted" with different marine organisms to make the dive interesting. It is important to note that neither tweaking predator-prey relationships nor reserving an area exclusively for nonharvesting income generation would be likely to occur under a rights-based system that granted rights on a species-specific basis. Rather, these innovations concerning the use of space emerge only because rights have been granted to the whole space rather than to species-specific components.
Should Rights-Based Systems be Species-Based or Space-Based?
A central question raised in all the articles in this symposium is whether rights-based systems for fisheries should be species-based or space-based. Anthony Scott (1955) suggested that the ideal system would be one that enables resource use decisions to be made as if a sole owner has control of the resource. Focusing on the optimal harvest rate, Scott argued that a sole owner would make decisions that resolve intertemporal tradeoffs, thus maximizing the value of the resource as an asset. Clearly there are other aspects of resource utilization decisions, in addition to quantity harvested, that are associated with optimizing the value derived from a species. For example, accounting for what fish are taken (size, sex, reproductive status), where they are taken, and when, suggest the need for a more complex and coordinated harvest strategy. Nevertheless, Scott's point still holds, namely that a sole owner would be expected to make resource use decisions that optimize the value of the species in question.
Shortcomings and Challenges of the Species-Based Approach
Species-based ITQs have been promoted because, in theory, they can be expected to facilitate (at least approximately) the sole owner solution. However, there are various imperfections associated with the way in which species-based ITQ access rights are typically designed in practice. First, ITQs are rarely granted to a sole owner. Instead, undifferentiated rights to catch a fraction of a TAC are granted to decentralized users. This solves (imperfectly) the issue of optimal total harvest, but it does not solve the internal coordination problem associated with specifying what, where, and when to harvest. This is potentially important because fish grow and move over time and space. Allocating undifferentiated rights to catch a fraction of the TAC may be too coarse of a tool to motivate decentralized optimization when fish have dramatically different values over time and space.
One way to solve this problem is to create individual rights that are more finely delineated over space and time. The drawback to this approach is that it involves higher enforcement and transactions costs, perhaps prohibitively high. The other way to solve the problem of imperfectly delineated individual rights is to grant individual undifferentiated species-based rights but with design mechanisms that facilitate cooperation and coordination. For example, governments could grant use rights directly to a cooperative institution rather than to individuals, with the expectation that the cooperative could resolve the internal coordination problems associated with what, where, and when to fish (Deacon, Parker, and Costello 2008) . The important unanswered question is whether more finely delineated individual rights or system designs that motivate increased cooperation and coordination are most likely to resolve the sole owner's The Economics of Territorial Use Rights Fisheries, or TURFsproblem most efficiently, net of transactions costs. The answer is likely to be case specific: some fisheries may not have coordination problems that are significant enough to warrant the costs of supporting cooperation.
In addition to the important fact that fish move over time and space (necessitating micro-coordination), marine ecosystems have interacting components. Conferring individual rights to multiple sole owners, each of whom manages his own single species in a marine ecosystem, does not prevent each from interfering with the harvests of others' species, dragging gear over productive habitat supporting other species, or taking too many fish that provide food for other sole owners' resources. This problem is amplified when rights are decentralized to multiple owners of species-specific rights. Thus conferring rights to harvest individual components of an interrelated system does not resolve potential externalities between components in the system. However, as Coase (1960) emphasized, conferring secure rights, even when they are imperfect, gives the impetus to resolve the remaining spillovers. Property rights or secure access rights can result in voluntary agreements that resolve external spillovers if the transaction costs of negotiation are low. Transaction costs would be relatively low if species-based rights were conferred to sole owners. We might expect that if the payoff was large enough, these sole owners would negotiate solutions to spillovers, just as neighboring farmers tend to resolve production externalities among themselves. But real-world ITQ systems are generally conferred to multiple owners, and individual owners have no incentives to negotiate with other individual owners holding rights for competing or complementary species. Thus resolving significant interspecies externalities in such a system appears to require some facilitation of coordination across rights holders, either from the bottom up through negotiations among systems of cooperatives, with each representing the interests of individual species-specific rights holders, or through formation of a systemwide cooperative.
Advantages and Challenges of the Space-Based Approach
TURF systems that grant collectives the right to use the entire marine ecosystem are effectively systemwide cooperatives. In principle, such cooperatives have the ability to resolve the problems of internal coordination of harvesting over time and space for individual species, interspecies interaction externalities, habitat destruction and rehabilitation externalities, and other local collective good externalities. If these externalities are significant, the advantage of a TURF as an institution is that it forces members to have a systemwide perspective from the outset. But resolving conflict and coordination problems is costly, and the degree to which a TURF system will generate sustainable rents depends on the costs and benefits of the collective coordination problem. 4 The experience with TURFs in Chile and Japan (as documented by Cancino [2007] and Uchida [2007] , respectively, and summarized here) offers useful lessons because the nearshore management structure in each country consists of hundreds of individual attempts to resolve the collective use problems within each MEA (in Chile) and FMO/FCA (in Japan). Chile's TURF system is relatively new compared to Japan's system. Thus an interesting question is whether the Chilean system will evolve over time to resemble the Japanese system more closely. 4 There is a large literature on this topic, led by Ostrom (1990) and others.
For now, however, there are important similarities as well as differences. Both systems devolve rights vested with the nation to local groups rather than individuals. Both systems maintain vestiges of top-down control to support science and monitoring and to ensure that responsible decisions are made at the local levels. Both delineate spatial TURF boundaries and legitimize boundaries with federal law, although enforcement is left to local groups. In both countries, these local groups have histories of interaction and are legitimate organizations rather than ad hoc collectives of individuals.
Although there are similarities, individual TURFs in both countries have been left to develop their own mechanisms for managing their resources and dealing with external conflicts. In Japan, interspecies and intergear conflicts have been addressed at the FCA level by explicitly allocating potentially conflicting activities to specialized zones. FMOs, the fishermen collectives, manage fishing operations for each fishery through intensive effort controls, thereby resolving many of the internal coordination problems associated with spatial and temporal movement of fish, and with potential crowding and congestion externalities. Day-to-day decisions are made collectively about whether to fish, where, and with what methods, in ways that account for growth and life cycle, migration, and market opportunities.
In Chile, most of the management remains with committees, elected managers, and group meetings, centralized at the MEA level. In some ways, ecosystem management in Chile appears to be simpler than in Japan, with most management effort focused on benthic organisms, particularly the valuable loco. The problem of optimal harvesting also seems simpler with loco than with finfish or other less sedentary organisms or more complex mixed-species ecosystems. Some MEAs simply conduct loco harvesting as a derby among local divers, whereas others allocate individual quotas to individual diver teams. Still others coordinate harvesting over space by rotating spatial assignments. But the main coordination activity concentrates harvesting over a short time window to meet production targets for the year's output. This leaves cooperative members free to pursue nonfishing activities over most of the year. Innovations in Chile's TURF system that would not occur under species-based ITQs include manipulation of predators and prey of the loco in order to maximize fishable biomass. In addition, MEAs located near urban and tourist areas invest in collective goods to capture other values such as with scuba diving, restaurants, and local fish markets.
Concluding Thoughts
The take-away message from this discussion of TURFs is that space-based collective access rights appear to be a viable policy alternative, or even a complement, to species-based ITQs. TURFs open up opportunities for gains from coordinating the spatial and temporal uses of resources as well as from resolving interspecies conflicts (in harvesting and predator/prey). Actual outcomes depend heavily on the ability of the TURF's governance structure to resolve externalities and internal coordination tasks efficiently, fairly, and with low transactions costs. This in turn depends on many of the features identified by others as important for the success of collective governance structures, including leadership, education, and social cohesion of members (Ostrom 1990; Schlager and Ostrom 1992) .
The issue of scale has been prominent in many critiques of the prospects for TURFs to manage fisheries effectively (Kaffine and Costello 2011; White and Costello 2011) . These critiques maintain that the scale of a TURF must match the range of the species. This is sometimes
The Economics of Territorial Use Rights Fisheries, or TURFsseen as a deal breaker by those who argue that TURFs must be very large in order to contain the full migratory range of all species in the system. But in Japan, there are numerous examples of species migrating across the boundaries of different FCAs, and in many instances, this issue has been resolved through the formation of new FMOs whose scope reaches across multiple FCAs. Although the members of the new FMO maintain their association with their respective FCAs, they coordinate and jointly manage the migratory resource. This example reinforces a point made earlier, that even partial and imperfect property rights provide an impetus for resolving externalities. In Japan, the institutional flexibility of the TURF system allows bottom-up creation of new management entities when necessary for particular species.
Perhaps the question of scale should be rephrased as a more encompassing question, namely, what scale TURF is large enough to internalize the most important inter-TURF externalities, yet small enough to ensure that the transaction costs of resolving intra-TURF coordination problems are manageable? This puts the focus less on biology and more on the larger question of ensuring successful collective management. Both the Chilean and Japanese systems have adopted scales for TURFs that are coincident with the ranges of historical use and user groups. 5 The establishment of early FCAs in Japan followed this principle, and experience with them suggests that successful TURFs can build on established patterns of use by local groups of users. Many of Chile's most successful TURFs have been established by long-standing local harvester cooperatives in their customary areas of use. In contrast, Chile's most contentious TURF creation has occurred in areas historically unharvested or harvested in rotation by mobile fleets of outsiders. In these cases, there are no established local user groups to grandfather in, and the results have been "land-grab" applications for large and seemingly ungovernable TURFs. In summary, TURFs appear to have a number of potential advantages over conventional species-based rights systems such as ITQs. At the same time, capturing the full potential of space-based institutions has a cost, namely the need for an effective internal governance structure that resolves within-TURF common pool effects and distributional conflicts, as well as enforcement conflicts with those who are excluded. Effective and sustainable self-governance, in turn, is more likely to emerge from a bottom-up rather than top-down process of institutional development. The need for locally driven institutional change may favor TURFs in developing countries where top-down institutions are absent, weak, or corrupt. It is hard to imagine, for example, ITQs being enforceable in mixed nearshore artisanal fisheries with many users targeting multiple species with varied gear types and multiple landing points. Self-managing TURFs appear to have more promise, although creating them requires a number of contentious steps including closing access, implementing internal governance, and enforcing against rent dissipation by both insiders and outsiders. These kinds of steps disturb customary use patterns and existing political equilibria and hence must be negotiated skillfully and carefully, with concern for the nuances of local power relationships and sensitivity to the perspectives of those who might lose from a realignment of resource access conventions. But it is easy to imagine that if these political economy hurdles can be overcome, then TURFs 5 Libecap, Arnason, and Anderson (2011) argue that there are efficiency and political economy reasons to allocate rights for fisheries on scales and in amounts that coincide with existing uses (i.e., reasons to grandfather in existing participants).
may be an institution, perhaps the only institution, that has a chance of rationalizing developing country artisanal fisheries in a manner that taps their potential to reduce poverty.
